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SUBJ: THE WEST'S RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA -- A POLICY
FRAMEWORK (PART ONE)

BEGIN SUMMARY: AS WE PREPARE FOR THE TITO TRANSITION ERA,
STRENGTHENING YUGOSLAVIA'S TIES WITH THE UNITED STATES IS
OF OBVIOUS IMPORTANCE. BUT THERE IS A BROADER ASPECT, AS
WELL: HOW TO GENERATE A COMMON WESTERN EFFORT AIMED
AT STRENGTHENING OUR OWN EFFORTS TO:

-- OFFSET THE PRESENCE AND INHIBIT THE PRESSURE OF THE
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SOVIET UNION, AND IN SO DOING MAKE LESS LIKELY ANY
YUGOSLAV MOVE, WHETHER UNDER PRESSURE OR PERCEIVED
NECESSITY, TOWARD CLOSER TIES WITH THE SOVIETS.

-- DISCOURAGE NATIONALISM AND SEPARATISM, THE
GREATEST FORCE FOR INSTABILITY IN POST-TITO
YUGOSLAVIA.

-- MOVE YUGOSLAVIA FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD FROM
ITS LENINIST PAST TO A MORE "LIBERAL" FUTURE.

THAT A COORDINATED WESTERN APPROACH CAN MORE REASONABLY
BE EXPECTED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ABOVE IS OBVIOUS. YET,
BECAUSE EACH OF US THINKS ABOUT, AND DEALS WITH
YUGOSLAVIA LARGELY IN BILATERAL TERMS, WE UNDERESTIMATE
OUR INFLUENCE AND MISS OPPORTUNITIES FOR BOTH JOINT AND
INDIVIDUAL STEPS. IN SUM, THE WEST HAS NO COMMON POLICY
FRAMEWORK FOR THE POLITICALLY CRITICAL PERIOD AHEAD. THIS
CABLE SUGGESTS SOME ELEMENTS OF SUCH A FRAMEWORK, AND
DESCRIBES THE PROBLEMS WE BELIEVE IT BEHOOVES THE WEST TO BEGIN
TO ADDRESS NOW, WHILE WE STILL HAVE TIME. A SUBSEQUENT CABLE
WILL SET FORTH A SUGGESTED ACTION AGENDA. END SUMMARY.

1. THE US-SOVIET EQUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA IS STARKLY UNEQUAL.
ECONOMICALLY, THE SOVIET UNION IS YUGOSLAVIA'S LARGEST
TRADING PARTNER, WITH A SHARE OF TOTAL TRADE MORE THAN THREE
TIMES GREATER THAN THE UNITED STATES' 5 PERCENT. MILITARILY,
MOSCOW PROVIDES YUGOSLAVIA WITH MOST OF ITS TANKS, AIRCRAFT,
ROCKETS AND OTHER SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT, WHILE THE U.S.
HAS SUPPLIED NOTHING MORE THAN SPARE PARTS AND SMALL ITEMS
SINCE THE EARLY 1960'S. EVEN IF, AS WE ANTICIPATE, 1978
SEES AN EXPANSION OF OUR MILITARY COOPERATION, SOVIET
MILITARY SALES WILL BE 10 TO 20 TIMES GREATER THAN OUR OWN,
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WHILE THE SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN YUGOSLAV PORTS WILL REMAIN
VERY SUBSTANTIALLY LARGER THAN OURS. POLITICALLY, MARXISM-
LENINISM AND ENGAGEMENT IN NON-ALIGNMENT STILL LEADS
YUGOSLAVIA TO ALIGN ITSELF WITH THE USSR ON FAR MORE FOREIGN
POLICY AND IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES THAN IS TRUE FOR THE WEST.
AND THE SOVIET UNION'S GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY MAKES IT A MUCH
GREATER MILITARY THREAT, AND THUS A COUNTRY WITH WHICH
YUGOSLAVIA HAS TO RECKON FAR MORE THAN THE UNITED STATES.

2. WHILE THERE ARE SOME THINGS THE UNITED STATES CAN
DO TO STRENGTHEN ITS PRESENCE, WE CANNOT
"RIGHT THE BALANCE" BY OURSELVES. BUT THE WEST, TAKEN AS A
WHOLE, CAN GO A LONG WAY TOWARD DOING SO: THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY'S 34 PERCENT OF YUGOSLAVIA'S TRADE IS DOUBLE THAT
OF THE SOVIET UNION. AND THE WEST, AS A WHOLE, HAD 49 PERCENT
OF YUGOSLAVIA'S TRADE VS. 32 PERCENT FOR ALL COMMUNIST
COUNTRIES. MILITARILY, GREAT BRITAIN IS THE ONLY COUNTRY
WHICH HAS SUPPLIED YUGOSLAVIA WITH WEAPONS WITHOUT A BREAK
SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR, WHILE FRANCE, SWEDEN AND OTHER
ARE ALSO SUPPLIERS. THE GOY LOOKS PRIMARILY TO THE WEST FOR
HELP IN CONTROLLING SEPARATISM -- FOR IT IS IN THE WEST
WHERE MOST OF THE TERRORIST-INCLINED EMIGRES ARE BASED. FINALLY,

THERE IS A STRONG CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ATTRACTION HERE TO EUROPE'S MODERN MAINSTREAM, E.G. THE YUGOSLAV COMMUNIST PARTY (LCY) HAS EXTENSIVE RELATIONS NOT ONLY WITH THE EUROCOMMUNISTS BUT ALSO WITH WESTERN EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS.

3. THE WEST'S POTENTIAL MAKES IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO SET OURSELVES MAJOR OBJECTIVES. BUT IT ALSO DEFINES THE DISTANCE WE HAVE TO TRAVEL TO ACHIEVE THEM.

-- FIRST, YUGOSLAVIA SHOULD HAVE AN ALTERNATIVE TO BECOMING SO DEPENDENT ON THE USSR THAT IN A "POST-TITO" PERIOD OF RELATIVE INSTABILITY, VULNERABILITY AND INSECURITY, THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT DECIDE OR FEEL
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COMPELLED TO MOVE CLOSER TO MOSCOW AND THE WARSAW PACT. WHAT THE YUGOSLAVS NEED IS AN "ANCHOR TO WINDWARD" WHICH THEY FEEL THEY CAN RELY UPON TO RESIST THE PULL OF THE EAST. THE WEST CAN PROVIDE THAT ANCHOR. HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL VISITS, STATEMENTS AND OTHER INDICATIONS OF WESTERN INTEREST IN YUGOSLAVIA'S INDEPENDENCE ARE CRUCIAL. BUT THEY WILL BE OF LITTLE REAL SUBSTANCE UNLESS A FAR STRONGER FABRIC OF ACROSS-THE-BOARD ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, MILITARY AND CULTURAL FORMS OF COOPERATION IS DEVELOPED BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE WEST. WE AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN INUNDATED IN RECENT MONTHS WITH STATEMENTS BY SENIOR OFFICIALS THAT THEY ARE BEING FORCED TO BECOME DANGEROUSLY DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIETS ECONOMICALLY BECAUSE OF WESTERN INDIFFERENCE AND TRADE RESTRICTIONS. ADMITTEDLY, THIS IS A SUBSTANTIAL OVERSTATEMENT DESIGNED IN PART TO PLAY UPON WHAT YUGOSLAVS KNOW TO BE A SENSITIVE NERVE. BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT YUGOSLAVIA HAS ENORMOUS TRADE IMBALANCES WITH MOST OF HER WESTERN TRADING PARTNERS AND THE SOVIET'S SHARE OF YUGOSLAVIA'S TRADE IS LIKELY TO RISE SHARPLY THIS YEAR. IN THE MILITARY FIELD, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT OUR GOAL TO MATCH SOVIET ARMS SALES HERE, THE WEST'S - AND PARTICULARLY U.S.'S -- RATHER MODEST EFFORTS TO DATE SURELY ARE READ BY YUGOSLAVIA AS A POLITICAL MESSAGE: THEY UNDOUBTEDLY ASSUME WE ARE FAR BETTER COORDINATED THAN IS THE CASE, AND THAT NATO HAS TAKEN A DECISION NOT TO SELL REASONABLY MODERN ITEMS AT A REASONABLE PRICE. IN SHORT, THE WEST SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT OUR COMMON HESITATION ON ARMS SALES MUST RAISE IN MANY MINDS DOUBTS WHICH CAN HAVE AN IMPACT BOTH ON THE
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YUGOSLAV WILL AND CAPACITY TO RESIST, AND ON SOVIET READINGS OF OUR READINESS TO HELP THEM DO SO.

-- SECOND, MOST ANALYSTS AGREE THAT THE GREATEST DANGER TO POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA LIES IN NATIONALIST AND SEPARATIST INSPIRED INSTABILITY. THIS IS FAR MORE AN INDIGENOUS THAN FOREIGN PROBLEM, BUT EMIGRE SUPPORT FOR SEPARATISM AND ORGANIZED ACTS OF TERRORISM ARE LIKELY TO GROW POST-TITO AND COULD PLAY A CRITICAL ROLE. (SOVIET INSPIRED SEPARATIST ACTIVITIES MAY ALSO BE A FACTOR. BUT THEY WILL BE DIRECTED AND DELIBERATE ACTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY, NOT, AS IN THE WEST, SUI GENERIS). MANY WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE A YUGOSLAV EMIGRE TERRORIST PROBLEM AND OUR OVERALL RECORD IN ADDRESSING THAT PROBLEM IS POOR. AS IN THE MILITARY FIELD, THIS RELATIVE INACTION ON TERRORISM IS READ HERE BOTH IN THE GOVERNMENT AND BY PEOPLE WITH SEPARATIST PROCLIVITIES AS AN INDICATION OF A LARGER WESTERN INTENTION. AN EFFECTIVE WESTERN POLICY WILL REQUIRE A GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INACTION ON OUR PART, AND RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR A COMMON SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS TO A POTENTIALLY SERIOUSLY DESTABILIZING INFLUENCE.

-- THIRD, IF YUGOSLAVIA IS TO BE STABLE OVER THE LONGER-TERM, WE BELIEVE ITS COURSE MUST BE A CONTINUATION OF THE LIBERALIZING TREND THAT HAS, WITH UPS-AND-DOWNS, MARKED ITS HISTORY OVER THE COURSE OF THE PAST 30 YEARS. THIS IS NOT TO IMPLY THAT IT IS INEVITABLE, OR EVEN NECESSARILY DESIREABLE, THAT YUGOSLAVIA BECOME A MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY. RATHER, THE ALREADY VISIBLE, ALBEIT ERRATIC, PROCESS OF LOOSENING OF GOVERNMENTAL CONTROLS SHOULD CONTINUE, WITH WHATEVER MEANINGFUL ENCOURAGEMENT THE WEST CAN GIVE IT. OUR SECRET

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STRONGEST CARD IS TO HELP FURTHER THIS SOCIETY'S ALREADY PERCEPTIBLE AND GRADUAL EMERSION INTO THE CULTURE, ETHOS AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF WESTERN EUROPE AND THE WEST AS A WHOLE.

4. CONCLUSION. OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE WEST'S OVERALL RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA REVEALS SERIOUS CURRENT WEAKNESSES,

DIFFICULT BARRIERS TO OVERCOME BUT CONSIDERABLE UNTAPPED
POTENTIAL. MOVES THAT MAY HELP US REALIZE THAT POTENTIAL WILL
BE THE SUBJECT OF A SUBSEQUENT CABLE. EAGLEBURGER UNQUOTE VANCE

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